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Abstract— We study a multi-body asset-guarding game in
missile defense where teams of interceptor missiles collaborate
to defend a non-manuevering asset against a group of threat
missiles. We approach the problem in two steps. We first
formulate an assignment problem where we optimally assign
subsets of collaborating interceptors to each threat so that all
threats are intercepted as far away from the asset as possible.
We assume that each interceptor is controlled by a collaborative
guidance law derived from linear quadratic dynamic games.
Our results include a 6-DOF simulation of a 5-interceptor
versus 3-threat missile engagement where each agent is modeled
as a missile airframe controlled by an autopilot. Despite the
assumption of linear dynamics in our collaborative guidance
law and the unmodeled dynamics in the simulation environment
(e.g., varying density and gravity), we show that the simulated
trajectories match well with those predicted by our approach.
Furthermore, we show that a more agile threat, with greater
speed and acceleration, can be intercepted by inferior intercep-
tors when they collaborate. We believe the concepts introduced
in this paper may be applied in asymmetric missile defense
scenarios, including defense against advanced cruise missiles
and hypersonic vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2019 Missile Defense Review [1] describes an evolv-
ing threat environment due to advanced cruise missiles and
hypersonic weapons that can travel at exceptional speeds
with unpredictable flight paths, challenging existing defen-
sive systems. The escalated difficulty posed by such highly
maneuverable threats require novel defensive capabilities.
The approach studied in this paper is to employ a salvo
defense where teams of interceptors under the influence of
a collaborative guidance law engage more agile, evasive
threats. When multiple threats must be engaged, the teams
of interceptors must be optimally assigned to each threat.
In [2], Isaacs introduces the classic target-guarding game
involving a pursuer, evader, and defender. The author notes
conditions on defender maneuverability relative to that of the
pursuer required for successful defense of the evader. Since
this seminal work, such “pursuit-evasion” games and relevant
solution methods have been well studied using the theory of
dynamic games [3], [4], [5].
The target-guarding game has been used in missile defense
applications such as the problem of protecting an aircraft
from a homing missile. In [6], [7], [8], the authors address
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“Target-Attacker-Defender” (TAD) scenarios where the three
agents have planar, nonlinear equations of motion. The target
and defender cooperate under a guidance law derived from
either an optimal control problem or dynamic game where
the objective is to maximize the distance between the target
and attacker at the time of intercept. In [9] the authors
consider different cooperation schemes between the defender
and target, showing that although two-way cooperation pro-
vides the best performance, one-way cooperation schemes
(e.g., defender assists target but not vice versa) are still
better than when the agents act independently. The authors in
[10] also consider the TAD scenario with planar, nonlinear
simulation models but use linearized kinematic models in
an adaptive cooperative defender-target guidance scheme.
The derived guidance laws induce evasive maneuvers by
the target so that the defender’s control effort is minimized
- supporting the idea of using relatively inferior defending
missiles against potentially more capable attacker missiles.
Linearized planar models are also used in [11] and [12] to
derive cooperative guidance laws in TAD scenarios using
optimal control and differential game formulations, showing
that linear models are sufficient for guidance applications.
Other work in target-guarding games include [13] where
cooperating pursuers engage a moving target with the ob-
jective to not only minimize miss distance but also impose
a certain flight path angle relative to teammates. In [14],
the authors implement a receding horizon algorithm that
employs the linear quadratic game framework for target
guarding games. The authors of [15] present a method
that can efficiently solve a certain class of Hamilton-Jacobi
equations related to the time-optimal guidance control of
multiple pursuers collaborating to capture an evader.
In this paper we consider TAD scenarios but whereas the
cited prior work generally addresses scenarios with a single
threat and a single interceptor, we consider an arbitrary num-
ber of collaborating interceptors defending an asset against
an arbitrary number of threats - an “M-vs-N” multi-body
engagement. While existing work on collaborative guidance
has focused on cooperation between interceptor and asset or
between two interceptors, deriving specific analytical solu-
tions for those special cases and/or using relative reference
frames, we introduce a framework that may be generalized
to engagements of arbitrary size. Our approach consists of
two steps: (1) deriving collaborative guidance laws and (2)
predicting the performance of the guidance laws by solving
an assignment problem. We use results from linear quadratic
dynamic game theory to develop collaborative guidance laws
that scale well with large engagements.
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In our assignment problem we employ combinatorial op-
timization methods developed for general agent-task assign-
ment problems, such as those described in [16] and [17].
These methods are also used in missile resource allocation
problems for independently guided interceptors in [18] and
[19]. However, we extend the problem to the assignment of
teams of collaborating interceptors against multiple threats.
The problem of assigning collaborating agents to tasks was
studied in [20] for general agent-task problems but to the best
of our knowledge has not been applied to missile defense.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use the notation Ii to refer to the ith interceptor and
Tj to refer to the jth threat. The set of all interceptors and
the set of all threats are denoted as I := {I1, . . . , IM} and
T := {T1, . . . ,TN}, respectively. Let Ik for k = 1, . . . ,2M − 1
denote each of the possible subsets of I, excluding the empty
set. We use the notation Ik[i] to refer to the ith interceptor
of interceptor group k. As an example, for three interceptors
I1, I2, I3 ∈ I we may define the following interceptor groups:
I1 := {I1} I2 := {I2} I3 := {I3} I4 := {I1, I2}
I5 := {I1, I3} I6 := {I2, I3} I7 := {I1, I2, I3}
and note that the 2nd interceptor in the 6th group is I6[2] = I3.
Throughout the paper we use 0 to represent a rectangular
zero matrix where a superscript refers to the matrix dimen-
sions. Similarly, we use 1 to refer to the identity matrix.
III. ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM FORMULATION
The mathematical model for the collaborating agents as-
signment problem (hereinafter referred to as the “assignment
problem,” is given by equations (1) - (5). The problem
data that must be computed prior to solving this assignment
problem is the reward matrix, r ∈ RN×2M−1, where r jk is the
reward of assigning interceptor group Ik to threat Tj. This
elemental reward r jk is defined in the subsequent section;
we consider its computation as a separate issue from the
formulation of the assignment problem.
max
z
min
j,k
r jkz jk (1)
s.t.
2M−1
∑
k=1
z jk = 1 ∀ j = 1, . . . ,N (2)
N
∑
j=1
z jk ≤ 1 ∀ k = 1, . . . ,2M−1 (3)
∑
{k|Ii∈Ik}
N
∑
j=1
z jk ≤ 1 ∀ i = 1, . . . ,M (4)
z jk ∈ {0,1} (5)
The assignment matrix z ∈ {0,1}N×2M−1 is the decision
variable, where z jk = 1 if interceptor group Ik is assigned to
threat Tj and 0 otherwise. Note that the objective in equation
(1) is defined as the smallest entry of the elementwise
product between r and z. Hence, we are maximizing the
smallest elemental reward that results from assembling and
assigning certain interceptor groups to each of the threats.
As shown, constraint sets (2) - (4) assume that there are
more interceptors than threats (i.e., M ≥ N). The first set
of constraints (2) ensure that every threat Tj is assigned
an interceptor group while the second set of constraints
(3) enforce each possible interceptor group Ik, from k =
1, . . . ,2M−1, to pursue no more than one threat. We use the
set of constraints in (4) to limit each individual interceptor
to participate in no more than one interceptor group. Finally,
constraint (5) ensures that the elements of the matrix z
are binary. Note that by introducing a slack variable and
transforming the optimization program into epigraph form,
we can formulate the stated assignment problem as a mixed-
integer linear program to be solved by off-the-shelf solvers.
When M ≥N, it is possible to intercept all threats. In fact,
if M is strictly greater than N, it may not be necessary to
launch all interceptors to maximize the objective. However
when M < N, there are not enough interceptors to intercept
all threats. In this case, we assume that all interceptors
must be employed to maximize the objective under limited
resources. We therefore modify the assignment problem for
the M < N case by changing the equality in equation (2)
into an “≤” inequality, and also changing the inequality in
equation (3) into an equality. An inequality in the constraint
equations means that the summation on the left-hand side
can equal either 0 or 1 whereas an equality requires it to
equal 1.
IV. ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM DATA
In this section we define the reward matrix, r, for our
assignment problem and show how we may compute it for an
arbitrarily large M-versus-N engagement. We first introduce
the single agent model - the dynamical model used to predict
the motion of individual agents - followed by the multi-agent
model. Then we describe a collaborative guidance law that
is used to produce the elemental reward r jk that quantifies
that value of assigning interceptor group Ik to threat Tj.
A. Dynamical Models for Prediction
1) Single Agent Model: We first assume a double-
integrator, continuous-time dynamical model for each of the
agents. The state vectors of the (evading) asset, interceptors,
and threats are denoted by xE , xIi , xTj ∈ Rnx , respectively,
where nx = 6 for a 3-dimensional engagement. Similarly, we
denote the input vectors as uE , uIi , uTj ∈ Rnu , where nu = 3.
We then discretize the continuous-time model using zero-
order hold on the inputs with an appropriate sample time
to obtain discrete-time linear models with state and input
matrices of appropriate size (e.g., AE ∈Rnx×nx ,BE ∈Rnx×nu ).
xE (h+1) = AExE (h)+BEuE(h) (6)
xIi (h+1) = AI xIi (h)+BI uIi(h) ∀ i = 1, . . . ,M (7)
xTj(h+1) = AT xTj(h)+BT uTj(h) ∀ j = 1, . . . ,N (8)
2) Multi-Agent Model: Consider an engagement between
a subset of interceptors Ik ∈ I and a threat Tj ∈ T. Let us
define m := |Ik|. Then the total number of agents, including
the asset, is q := m + 2. As a convention used in this
paper, we build the augmented state vector for the {E,Ik,Tj}
engagement by stacking the asset first, followed by the
interceptors and then the threat:
x :=

xE xIk

xTj
=

xE xIk [1]...
xIk [m]

xTj
 . (9)
We then stack the input vectors of the asset and the
interceptors together into a single vector and the inputs of
the threat in another. The asset and interceptors constitute a
team driven by a collaborative guidance law while the threat
is guided under a separate law that targets the asset while
avoiding the interceptors.
u :=

uEuIk

=

uEuIk [1]...
uIk [m]

 , v := [uTj] . (10)
The full multi-agent system can be expressed as
x(h+1) = Ax(h)+Buu(h)+Bvv(h) , (11)
where the dimensions are listed below.
x ∈ Rq·nx×1 combined state
u ∈ R(m+1)·nu×1 control of interceptors & asset
v ∈ Rnu×1 control of threat
A ∈ Rq·nx×q·nx state matrix of the game
Bu ∈ Rq·nx×(m+1)·nu input matrix of interceptors & asset
Bv ∈ Rq·nx×nu input matrix of threat
The state and input matrices are constructed with the
following MATLAB pseudocode:
A = blkdiag(AE , 1m⊗AI , AT ) (12)
Bu = blkdiag(BE , [(1m⊗BI);0nx×m·nu ]) (13)
Bv = [0(m+1)·nx×nu ; BT ] (14)
where blkdiag is the block diagonal concatenation of the
input arguments and ⊗ is the Kronecker tensor product.
The matrices take the following form:
A =

[
AE
]
0nx×m·nx 0nx×nx
0m·nx×nx
 AI . . .
AI
0m·nx×nx
0nx×nx 0nx×m·nx
[
AT
]
 (15)
Bu =

[
BE
]
0nx×m·nu
0m·nx×nu
BI . . .
BI

0nx×nu 0nx×m·nu
 , Bv =

0nx×nu
0m·nx×nu[
BT
]
 (16)
B. Collaborative guidance law
In this section, we describe how we use results from finite-
horizon, discrete-time, linear-quadratic dynamic games to
induce collaborative guidance among the interceptors.
1) Linear Quadratic Dynamic Game: Following the work
of [21], we consider the linear, discrete-time dynamical
system in equation (11) where u is the minimizing team
and v is the maximizing agent with respect to the following
quadratic objective:
J
(
{u(h)}H−1h=0 , {v(h)}H−1h=0 ; x(0)
)
=
1
2
x>(H)QHx(H) +
1
2
H−1
∑
k=0
(
x>(h)Qx(h)+u>(h)Ruu(h)− v>(h)Rvv(h)
)
(17)
with symmetric weight matrices and horizon denoted by
QH ∈ Rq·nx×q·nx terminal state weights
Q ∈ Rq·nx×q·nx running state weights
Ru ∈ R(m+1)·nu×(m+1)·nu interceptor input weights
Rv ∈ Rnu×nu threat input weights
H ∈ Z≥0 finite horizon.
In this two-player game, where one player consists of the
interceptors and asset and the other player is the threat, each
is aware of the multi-agent system model (11). Both players
also have access to the system state (9) at any given time.
F(h) =
(
1(m+1)·nu −
[
B>u P(h+1)Bu+Ru
]−1 [
B>u P(h+1)Bv
][
B>v P(h+1)Bv−Rv
]−1 [
B>v P(h+1)Bu
])−1
· (18)([
B>u P(h+1)Bu+Ru
]−1 [
B>u P(h+1)Bv
][
B>v P(h+1)Bv−Rv
]−1
B>v P(h+1)−1q
)
A
G(h) =
(
1(n)·nu −
[
B>v P(h+1)Bv−Rv
]−1 [
B>v P(h+1)Bu
][
B>u P(h+1)Bu+Ru
]−1 [
B>u P(h+1)Bv
])−1
· (19)([
B>v P(h+1)Bv−Rv
]−1 [
B>v P(h+1)Bu
][
B>u P(h+1)Bu+Ru
]−1
B>u P(h+1)−1q
)
A
P(h) =
(
A+BuF(h)+BvG(h)
)>
P(h+1)
(
A+BuF(h)+BvG(h)
)
+
(
Q+F>(h)RuF(h)−G>(h)RvG(h)
)
(20)
P(H) = QH (21)
Under the following conditions:[
BTu P(h+1)Bu+Ru
] 0 ∀ h = 0, . . . ,H−1 (22)[
BTv P(h+1)Bv−Rv
]≺ 0 ∀ h = 0, . . . ,H−1 (23)
it can be shown there exists a unique, closed-form solution
to the discrete-time, linear-quadratic dynamic game (LQDG)
described by equations (11) and (17). More specifically, we
have explicit formulas for the optimal guidance strategy of
each player in the form of linear, state-feedback laws:
u∗(h) = F(h)x(h) ∀ h = 0, . . . ,H−1 (24)
v∗(h) = G(h)x(h) ∀ h = 0, . . . ,H−1 (25)
where expressions for the time-varying, state-feedback gain
matrices are shown in equation (18) for the minimizing
player and in equation (19) for the maximizing player.
Assuming that conditions (22) and (23) are satisfied, the
gain matrices can be found by recursively solving the Riccati
difference equation (20) from h = H − 1 to h = 0 with
equation (21). Note that a family of state-feedback gains,
computed with different weight matrices and horizon lengths,
can be solved ahead of time and stored for later use in real-
time collaborative guidance.
2) LQDG weights: Advanced methods for selecting or
tuning LQR weight matrices exist, with a whole section
devoted to the topic in [22]. Here we describe a simple
approach to designing the LQDG weight matrices Q, QH ,
Ru, Rv for an asset-guarding game. Since we are concerned
with the terminal state of the finite-horizon game and not
the trajectories taken to reach the terminal states, we take an
approach that is similar to that used to derive the classical
proportional navigation (PN) guidance law in [23]. We
penalize only the control effort and the relative terminal
states. Hence, the running state weight matrix is
Q = 0q·nx×q·nx (26)
For the terminal state and input weight matrices, we use a
rule of thumb [24], often called Bryson’s Rules [25], to make
the terms in the objective dimensionless and of the same
order of magnitude. In addition to this normalization, we
also introduce relative weighting for each state and control
variable. To design the input weight matrices, we define
block diagonal matrices Ru and Rv as
Ru = ρu ·blkdiag(RE , kron(eye(m),RI)) (27)
Rv = ρv ·RT (28)
The submatrices along the diagonal (i.e., RE , RI , RT )
normalize the inputs with respect to the horizon length H
and maximum acceptable input value umax :
RE = RI = αH(umax)2 ·1
nu ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m (29)
RT =
β
H(umax)2
·1nu , (30)
where we set RE = RI for the example in this paper. We
use α := 1(m+1)nu to scale each diagonal element of the Ru
weight matrix so that their sum is equal to 1. Similarly, β :=
1
n·nu is used to scale the diagonal elements of the Rv weight
matrix. Finally, ρu and ρv ∈ R weigh the input cost against
the terminal state cost.
To design the terminal state weight matrix QH , we first
introduce a relative state matrix Qrel illustrated below
Qrel :=

-S O . . . O S
O
...
O
S
. . .
S
-S
...
-S
 (31)
where S :=
[
1nx/2,0(nx/2)×(nx/2)
]
and O :=
[
0(nx/2)×(nx)
]
. The rela-
tive terminal positions can be expressed with the following
matrix-vector multiplication:
Qrelx(H) =

-S O . . . O S
O
...
O
S
. . .
S
-S
...
-S


xE xIk [1]...
xIk [m]

xTj
(H)
=

pTj(H)− pE(H)
pIk [1](H)− pTj(H)
...
pIk [m](H)− pTj(H)
 ∈ R(m+1)·(nx/2) , (32)
where the variable p ∈ Rnx/2 is used for the position vector.
The first set of elements in (32) is the threat’s terminal posi-
tion relative to the asset’s terminal position. Each subsequent
set contains, for the group Ik, each interceptor’s terminal
position relative to that of the threat Tj.
We introduce another intermediate matrix that is parame-
terized by a vector of positive parameters, d ∈ Rm+1 :
Qw(d) := blkdiag(−w(d1), . . . ,w(dm+1)) (33)
where
w(z) := diag
(
z
r2max
,
z
r2max
,
z
r2max
)
(34)
The constant rmax is the maximum acceptable relative dis-
tance. Note that the first diagonal block of (33) is negative
and recall that the interceptors and asset team is the mini-
mizer and the threat is the maximizer of the LQDG objective
(17). Since the interceptors are attempting to maximize
(threat is attempting to minimize) the final distance between
the threat and the asset, we place a minus sign in front of
this first diagonal block. For the remaining diagonal blocks
we keep the sign positive because the interceptors are indeed
attempting to minimize their relative distance to the threat,
and the threat is trying to maximize its distance from all
interceptors.
We now define the terminal state weight matrix QH as
QH(d) := Q>relQw(d)Qrel (35)
so that the terminal cost may be expressed as:
x>(H)QH(d)x(H) =
1
r2max

-d1
d2
...
dm+1

>
‖pTj(H) − pE(H)‖22
‖pIk [1](H)− pTj(H)‖22
...
‖pIk [m](H)− pTj(H)‖22
 (36)
We may constrain the parameter vector to belong to some
finite set, d ∈D , or we may place lower and upper bounds
on the values it may take: d ≤ d ≤ d. One simple approach
of creating a finite space D to search over is to compose it
with a set of parameter vectors that each make one element
value much larger than the others. The corresponding relative
distance will be penalized heavily. For example, if we make
d2 very large compared to the other parameters, we are
essentially choosing interceptor Ik[1] to intercept the threat
while remaining interceptors in the team, with less weight,
support the effort by influencing the threat to evade them.
Now that we have described how we design the weight
matrices Q, QH , Ru, Rv, we use the following expression[{F(h)}H−1h=0 ,{G(h)}H−1h=0 ]← LQDG(A,Bu,Bv,QH(d),Q,Ru,Rv)
(37)
to refer to the process of obtaining the solution to the LQDG,
where F and G are the sequence of state-feedback gain
matrices for the minimizer and maximizer, respectively.
We now take a step back and note that the LQDG is a
zero-sum game with a single objective that is minimized by
one team and maximized by the other. However, in an asset-
guarding game we may assume that each team has a different
objective. For example, the threat group is more concerned
with capturing the asset than evading the interceptors. On
the other hand, the interceptors may place more emphasis on
intercepting the threats than thwarting the threats’ effort to
hit the asset. For this reason, we construct different objectives
for the interceptors and threats, deriving guidance laws for
each team based on its particular objective. We assume that
the threat’s terminal weight matrix QG is known, that it
will place heavy weight on its relative distance to the asset
compared to those with the interceptors.[{F(h)}H−1h=0 ,∼]← LQDG(A,Bu,Bv,QF(d),Q,Ru,Rv) (38)[∼,{G(h)}H−1h=0 ]← LQDG(A,Bu,Bv,QG ,Q,Ru,Rv) (39)
We note that the guidance law for a team is only optimal
if the opposing team is also acting optimally with respect
to the same objective. Hence, the guidance laws resulting
from this approach are sub-optimal. Nevertheless, interesting
cooperative team behavior may be observed.
C. Reward definition
Recall that the reward matrix r in the objective of the
assignment problem (1) must be computed prior to solving
the problem. For every combination of interceptor group
Ik for k = 1, . . . ,2M − 1 and threats Tj, the corresponding
element of the reward matrix is computed with
r jk := solveReward(Tj,Ik) , (40)
where we define the function solveReward as
solveReward(Tj,Ik) :=
max
d∈D , H∈H
‖pTj(H)− pE(H)‖2 (41)
subject to
∃ Ii ∈ Ik 3 ‖pIi(H)− pTj(H)‖2 ≤ rc (42)
x(0) = [x>E (0),x
>
Ik
(0),x>Tj(0)]
> (43)
x(h+1) = Ax(h)+Buu(h)+Bvv(h) (44)
u(h) = sat (F(h)x(h),umax) (45)
v(h) = sat (G(h)x(h),vmax) (46)
{F(h)}H−1h=0 ← LQDG(A,Bu,Bv,QF(d),Q,Ru,Rv,H) (47)
{G(h)}H−1h=0 ← LQDG(A,Bu,Bv,QG ,Q,Ru,Rv,H) (48)
where pIi(T ) and pTj(T )∈R3 refer to the predicted positions
of interceptor Ii and threat Tj in inertial space at some
terminal time T and rc ∈ R represents a desired capture
(or lethal) radius. The terminal positions of each interceptor
and threat are predicted using equation (44) where the
state feedback commands are computed with (47) and (48),
and elementwise saturated with respect to some maximum
acceleration value assumed for each agent in equations (45)
and (46). If there does not exist a terminal time H ∈H such
that the intercept condition in (42) is satisfied, then we set
the value of r jk to a large negative value.
V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
We consider the scenario depicted in figure (1) where three
threat missiles have penetrated an outer defense screen to
reach within a 8000ft radius of a high-value asset, each with
a speed between 2400 and 2800ft/s. Five interceptor missiles
within a 500ft radius of the asset are launched with initial
speeds between 1800 and 2200ft/s. The maximum accelera-
tions of the threats and interceptors are assumed to be 30Gs
and 20Gs, respectively. Although not hypersonic, the threat
missiles are traveling faster and are more maneuverable than
the interceptors. The asset is traveling at a constant velocity
of 50ft/s and is assumed to be non-maneuverable compared
to speeds and accelerations of the missiles.
Fig. 1: Asset-guarding engagement with five interceptor
missiles against three threat missiles
The objective of the interceptors is to intercept (rc ≤
20ft) all threat missiles at distances as far as possible from
the asset. The interceptors are optimally assigned to the
threats and controlled by a collaborative intercept guidance
law. In this example, we assume that the threat missiles
do not collaborate with each other. However, each threat
missile is capable of tracking the positions and velocities of
collaborative interceptor groups that are targeting it. Hence,
the threats may perform evasive maneuvers to avoid the
interceptors while on trajectories to hit the asset.
For our 6 degree-of-freedom (DOF) simulation, we use
a non-linear, coupled 3-axis generic missile airframe model
from [26]. Six state variables (missile speed, angle-of-attack,
sideslip angle, roll rate, pitch rate, and yaw rate) are used
to describe missile motion in the body frame. Aerodynamic
forces and moments that enter the equations of motion are
modeled in terms of benchmark aero-coefficients that are also
provided in [26]. Another six states are used to describe the
position and attitude of the missile with respect to an inertial
reference frame. The missile is actuated through controls
surfaces in the roll, pitch, and yaw channels. We assume
that the missile has access to accurate state information.
The simulation model includes subsystems for the guidance
law, autopilot, and fin actuators as described in [27]. A
traditional 3-loop autopilot architecture, as detailed in [30],
is implemented for both the pitch and yaw channels whereas
a simple proportional-integral controller is used for the
roll channel. The autopilot subsystem is gain-scheduled to
obtain suitable performance throughout the operational flight
envelope of the missiles. Finally, a first-order model is used
for the fin actuators.
A. Solution to Assignment Problem
To compute the reward matrix for our assignment problem,
we first design the LQDG feedback gains in (47) and (48) for
a set of horizon values H , a coarse parameter search space
D , ρu = ρv = 1000, umax = 20G, vmax = 30G, and rmax = 20ft.
For each interceptor, threat and asset we use initial conditions
that satisfy the scenario description.
Using a computer with a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 64-bit
processor and 8 GB of RAM, a computation time of 52.6
seconds was required to construct the reward matrix and
0.9 seconds was required to solve the assignment problem.
With parallel computing, we expect that the reward matrix
computation time can be reduced significantly.
In table (I) we list the optimal assignments and note that
the predicted time to intercept all threats is 1.91 seconds.
We verify that each of the threats is predicted to enter the
lethal radius of one of the interceptors (‖pIi(H)−pTj(H)‖2 <
20 ft). We also observe that all threats are predicted to be
intercepted at a distance of at least 2115.2ft from the asset
(‖pTj(H)−pA(H)‖2).
B. 6DOF Simulation Results
When we apply the assignment and corresponding LQDG
guidance laws to the 6DOF simulation we observe that
all threats are intercepted within the predicted horizons,
as shown in table (I). With properly-tuned autopilots, we
note that the 6DOF simulation results in relative terminal
distances that match well with the predictions. In figures (2)
Assignment H
‖pIi (H)−pTj (H)‖2
Actual (Predicted)
‖pTj (H)−pA(H)‖2
Actual (Predicted)
{I4}→ {T1} 1.65s 19.2 (17.8) ft 2145.2 (2145.5) ft
{I1}→ {T2} 1.63s 19.4 (14.5) ft 2138.9 (2115.2) ft
{I2, I3,I5}→ {T3} 1.91s 14.7 (19.3) ft 2602.4 (2621.3) ft
TABLE I: Assignments and relative terminal distances for
both predicted and 6DOF simulation trajectories
and (3), we overlay the 6DOF missile trajectories on top
of the predicted trajectories. We observe that the autopilot-
controlled 6DOF missile system can effectively track the
guidance commands used in the predicted trajectories. The
blue bubbles represent the lethal radius of interceptors,
signifying successful intercept of threat missiles.
In figure (4) we show a zoomed-in, birds-eye view of
the engagement endgame (i.e., the last few miliseconds
of the engagement). We observe the one-on-one intercepts
of {I4} → {T1} and {I1} → {T2}. The sub-engagement of
interest is that of {I2, I3,15} → {T3}. Threat T3, which has
the greatest speed of the threats, is coralled into the trajectory
of I5 by I2 and I3. Here we can clearly see the effect of
the collaborative guidance law where the interceptor with
a strategic position and velocity advantage is employed to
intercept while the other interceptors influence the threat’s
trajectory by forcing it to evade them.
Fig. 2: Predicted & 6DOF missile trajectories of (blue)
interceptors, (red) threats, and aircraft carrier as (gray) asset
Fig. 3: Top (birds-eye) and side views of engagement
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We approach the multi-body asset-guarding game by de-
composing it into two steps: predicting multi-body trajecto-
ries using LQDG as a collaborative guidance law, and using
Fig. 4: Zoomed-in, birds-eye view of engagement endgame
the predictions to solve an assignment problem. Through
simulation, we observe that our approach can provide as-
signments and guidance laws that perform well despite the
linear assumptions made in the approach.
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